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THE BANK, THE FUND AND ALTERNATIVES IN SSA:
Dialogue or Parallel Diatribes
Reginald Herbold Green
On a cloth untrue,
With a twisted cue,
And elliptical billiard balls.
- Gilbert and Sullivan
SAPs at the centre
The focus of both policy and academic debate in Sub-Saharan Africa has 
become Structural Adjustment and World Bank designed/influenced, 
led/approved and supported Structural Adjustment Programmes. At times 
it seems one can only proceed to look at a topic by approaching it 
through a link to SA, e.g. "Environment in the context of Structural 
Adjustment" or "The impact of Structural Adjustment on Women in SSA" 1
This approach has some validity. Bank/Fund designed or otherwise, and 
whatever the wisdom of previous policies in very different global and 
national economic contexts, SSA economies have - with rare exceptions - 
faced mounting structural problems and mounting unsuccess in at least 
the first half of the 1980s to a degree requiring structural 
reformulation of strategy, policy, resource allocation and tactics.
And (as Percy Mistry finally admits in his paper) the World Bank has 
achieved broad control over the use of most bilateral donors fund flows 
to Africa and allocates them on the basis of its perception of the 
quality of the recipient's Sappery (or Sapiousness?). In a context of
2crippling loss of import "entitlements" (using the word in Sen's sense) 
SA does matter.
But much of the dialogue suffers from great fuzziness. The IMF and the 
Bank are conflated as are three fairly distinct stages in the Bank's 
SAP perception and praxis. Part of the reason is that the Fund and the 
Bank choose to differ as little as possible in public and that the Bank
- while surprisingly willing to learn from experience and adjust course
- it is rarely willing to admit publicly (much less in print) that it 
made a mistake so that the depth and extent of the changes are 
obscured. However, that hardly justifies the independent analysts who 
enhance the confusion - not least those of the UN Economic Commission 
for Africa and some of those prominent in the Institute for African 
Alternatives.
The Fund's operational model deals in monetary magnitudes, controlling 
(usually cutting) demand, a rather narrow array of macroeconomic 
instruments (especially exchange and interest rates and domestic credit 
formation) and is short term (1 to 3 years). The Bank's deals in real 
magnitudes, influencing production (usually enhancing), using a much 
wider array of macro and sectoral instruments and is medium to long 
term (3 to 12 years in SA). The divergences in approach are 
fundamental, the tensions virtually omnipresent and the agreements more 
cobbled compromises than sweeping syntheses. In SSA in the 1980s the 
Bank has assumed the lead role albeit tension persists since its %
perceptions on what prices are right, why and how to approach them are 
often rather different than those of the Fund which has bridgehead 
dominance on exchange rates.
3A complex, moving process (or -target)
Further, the Bank's SA approach has not been static. The 1981 
Accelerated Development ("Berg Report") and 1989 Long Term Policy Study 
are very different. (Like all Bank - or other institutional committee 
- written documents they are also less than fully internally 
consistent!) The first is relatively close to the IMF model somewhat 
disaggregated sectorally and linked - tenuously - to real (physical) 
supply magnitudes. By 1985 the Bank had come to see that was not 
enough in practice and, more serious, was not an adequate strategic 
formulation. Ghana's 1985 launching of major education, health and 
social components (PAMSCAD) with Bank acceptance and reformulation of 
what was basically a Ghana/UNICEF initiative, marked a sea change which 
has influenced most subsequent SAPs. LTPS provides a more elegant 
strategic justification in terms of human investment/productivity and 
human/welfare basic needs. It openly says putting Robert Macnamara's 
war against absolute poverty on hold from 1981 until 1988-89 was a 
mistake contributing to "the lost decade" in Africa. The renewed 
stress on basic needs and "eradicating" absolute poverty is underlined 
by the 1990 World Development Report whose title and key issue theme is 
Poverty.
But even more crucial than failing to grasp the complexity and 
changeability of SA (a rather crucial point in advising SAP negotiators 
as to their degrees of freedom), SAP centred dialogues or diatribes 
represent a defensive, reactive, dependent approach. Even efforts at 
African analysed/African based proposals tend to be in terms such as 
African Alternatives To Structural Adjustment Programmes (The UN 
Economic Commission for Africa's AFSAP, a seminal contribution to the
4dialogue which - intriguingly and invisibly to ECA - is 95 per cent 
compatible with the Bank's LTPS).
IFAA - The Achievement and its limits
IFAA - founded in 'exile' in London with chapters in Africa, now 
'returned home' to Johannesburg - is a major contributor to the 
dialogue. Its form and contributors have - by and large - been 
serious. It is committed to open discourse among people of varied 
views (as the present triad of papers illustrates). There is no doubt 
that it has raised its depth, quality and clarity. And yet.... IFAA 
illustrates all of the weakness, simplistic conflation and intellectual 
dependence in the sense of starting from the Bank's premises and agenda
(even if to criticise them) rather than an independent one. Too often
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its intellectual and institutional opponents have given it rather 
patronising praise implying any serious African intellectual discussion 
was a surprise to be patted on the head. It is perhaps time its 
friends who agree with much of its arguments, and who believe with 
Pliny the Elder, "Out of Africa there is something new", criticised it 
for not setting and achieving higher standards of clarity precision and 
contextually grounded originality. Doubtless IFAA lacks the finance, 
the data access and the sheer numbers of professionals of the Bank and 
its academic outriders. But it also is free from the institutional 
necessity of writing "apologia pro vita sua" and of insisting on the 
past success of a steadily adjusting adjustment prescription both to 
assist in selling it in Africa and in mobilising funds abroad and - 
unlike the Bank - its core participants are grounded in and know the 
SSA context personally and in detail.
The IMF and SA or How Can the New SA Use the Bank?
The first paper considered here - What Has The IMF In Store For South 
Africa? - illustrates those points. Surely "Growth and Redistribution 
in the New South Africa: What Roles for the Bank and Fund? would have 
been a superior starting point? And Kevin Davie of the South African 
business community and Ketso Gordhan of the African National Congress - 
both writing as individuals - do, in fact, pursue that reformulation. 
While both underestimate how structurally sick RSA's economy is and 
they respectively overstress areas of agreement and disagreement (at 
least at medium term operational level), they do show that a genuine 
internal basis for dialogue and policy reconciliation exists.
Ben Turok (IFAA's Director) is not at his best because his piece does 
conflate Fund and Bank. Thus it fails to note it is very much in the 
New South Africa's interests to be seen as an SSA lower middle income 
economy whose main partner will be the Bank not a middle income LA 
clone in respect to which the Bank would play a supporting role to the 
Fund.
Ben Magubane - in a trenchant forewarning of the pitfalls in Zimbabwe's 
shift of strategy, which have since been fallen into - fails either to 
perceive what Zimbabwe's basic economic problem as of 1989 was or to 
mention its chief cause. Zimbabwe in the 1980s had a creditable growth 
record - over 4 per cent a year - but a very low investment rate. As 
of 1989 it was nearing capacity constraints. And the basic economic 
'inefficiency' in Southern Africa over 1981-89 has been the economic 
and military war RSA has waged against its neighbours. Amazingly - 
despite about $60,000 million costs to the 10 SADCC States and perhaps 
$30,000 million in lost GDP to RSA — none of the contributors even
6mention this factor. Even the Bank — while ill at east with such an 
element — now recognises its significance.
Can the Bank Play What Roles Better?
Percy Mistry's, The Present Role Of The World Bank In Africa 
illustrates IFAA's strength and its commitment to open discourse.
Mistry is a former World Banker who was self critical then, and now as 
an academic can reflect more deeply and openly. He is, perhaps, an 
outstanding example of informed (and often far-reaching) criticism from 
a perspective of the Bank in Africa. (The present reviewer's stance is 
an Africa centred one on African realities and goals in relation to the 
Bank.) Ironically he poses contextual (African) issues and the Bank's 
limited ability, to date, to handle them well, rather more clearly than 
many of the less sympathetic critics.
In certain respects he may be too hard on the Bank. It's supposed role 
as a debt collector is rather dubious given its leadership in pushing 
for SSA low income economy debt write-offs from 1985 to date. So too 
if 60 per cent of its SSA projects have 15 per cent return rates this 
is low versus 80 per cent in other regions but high vis-a-vis bilateral 
or national project averages.
Mistry accepts four key weaknesses of SAPs to date:
1. they are not contextual enough
2. agreement on goals papers over disagreement on means and timing
3. SAPs do not raise growth rates to sustainably high levels and are
particularly weak at raising domestic savings rates
4. the Bank has a distinct tendency to arrogance (or Platonic 
Guardianship) causing it to undervalue domestic input and 
national (or other) alternative proposals.
However, Mistry argues that the Bank's ideological fixation on 
privatisation diverges from a more pragmatic practice and that the 
latter has become increasingly flexible since the high noon of the 
Reagan/Thatcher era. Would it were so.
The point Mistry makes that the Bank is a good servant but a bad master 
and is most effective when confronted by a coherent intellectual and 
factual position from a country with some room for manoeuvre is very 
true. However, only the first condition - an area in which reactive 
critiques are not enough - is within the ability of most SSA states to 
meet. The Bank is well aware that its ideas "win" because they are 
backed by resources which are badly needed and not available from other 
sources and is fairly open in agreeing it uses that power.
Inside Out - And Dpside Down?
Michael Irwin's Inside The World Bank is disappointing. It never rises 
above the level of second rate participatory investigative journalism 
and often falls below that. The author's sincerity and anger are clear 
enough but appear to have driven out both analysis and sense of 
proportion. More could have been expected from an Acting Vice- 
President who resigned on principle.
Using constant prices the Bank's reorganisation did work in its own 
terms. Administrative costs were $50 million lower and real lending 
per employee 8 per cent higher on Irwin's only 1987-90 figures. A much
8more serious question is whether those should have been key goals or 
whether the inadequate training strategy, the falling proportion of 
senior staff with 'real world' operational experience and the glaring 
gaps in some fields, e.g. agriculture and institutional/operational 
public finance, were (and are) not more serious problems.
That the Bank, like other large bodies, has wastes (combined with 
overskimping elsewhere) is well known as is its tendency to excessive 
formalism. Irritating as these facets are, how crucial are they?
His comments on arrogance are to a real point but perhaps miss a more 
basic one. The Bank does learn from experience but rarely admits 
error, therefore it remains sure, it is at any given time right, and 
therefore frequently believes that alternative floaters as well as 
critics are bores to be tolerated. That is a serious substantive 
weakness more damaging than an arrogant style. Similarly, the problem 
on information secrecy is not, in practice, that it is all that hard to 
secure large quantities of information. Rather it is that it comes on 
a "grace and favour", not a "right to know" basis and thus tends to 
soften many recipients' tones in a way that would not happen if the 
Bank had a "Freedom of Information" Act.
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